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The United States and Mexico are geographic neighbors with high 
economic asymmetry, but with intense shared history and deep social, 
cultural, economic, and security ties. Among these shared interests 
are 23 rivers and numerous aquifers along the 3,000 km border.1 Of 
these, two are the primary focus of the two governments, the Colorado 
and Rio Grande rivers. These scarce resources in the region, which 
ranges from semiarid in the west to arid in the center and humid in 
the east, require cooperation to manage and have been responsible for 
shaping much of the 170+ year relationship.
In 2015, over 15.3 million people resided along the United States- 
Mexico border in ten states, which include 24 counties in the United 
States and 35 municipalities in Mexico.2 Ninety percent of the residents 
on the border live in 15 sister cities linked through trade, employment, 
culture, and education, among others (see Figure 3.1).3 Movement of 
goods and people across the border is part of everyday life in this re-
gion. For example, in 2016, over 180 million persons crossed into the 
United States from Mexico through the 55 ports of entry in personal 
vehicles or as pedestrians for purposes of tourism, shopping, or day 
trips.4 Also, the highest concentration of US manufacturing associated 
with foreign direct investment exists along the United States-Mexico 
border and is one of the most important sources of employment for 
this region.5 The population in the border region has grown at a faster 
pace than that of the general population in both the United States and 
Mexico.6 The accelerated growth along the border has aggravated the 
need for water and other basic infrastructure in a region where budg-
ets allocated for such amenities are below required levels. As a result, 
human health and the environment in this region have been negatively 
impacted on both sides.
Common water supplies, including the border’s two major riv-
ers, the Colorado and Rio Grande (see Figure 3.2), and numerous 
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transboundary aquifers, have been negatively impacted by drought, 
overdraft, and pollution that have increased salinity levels and de-
graded water quality. About 97 percent of the basin of the Colorado 
River lies within the United States. Originating in the state of Colo-
rado, the river’s basin traverses Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and Califor-
nia before reaching Mexico.7 Approximately 40 million residents rely 
on Colorado and its tributaries for municipal use, of which 2 million 
are in Mexico.8 The Rio Grande River also originates in the state of 
Figure 3.2 Colorado River and Rio Grande basins.
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Colorado and crosses New Mexico before forming the international 
boundary between Texas and Mexico. It is the "fth longest river in the 
United States and supplies water to more than six million residents in 
both countries.9 Since 1848, as populations and economic growth in 
the border region have continuously expanded, these two rivers have 
been the focus of cooperation between the United States and Mexico.
Today, the primary institutions involved in cooperation over water 
resources along the border include the International Boundary and 
Water Commission (IBWC) and the North American Development 
Bank (NADB).10 Scholarly literature consistently associates these two 
organizations with transboundary water issues and concurs on "ve 
basic premises: (1) much work has been accomplished along the border 
to address disputes and the discharge of wastewater into shared water 
bodies; (2) the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in-
jected much-needed attention on the need to address transboundary 
water pollution through wastewater infrastructure, as well as funding 
for such projects from the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and Mexico’s National Water Commission (Conagua); 
(3) the IBWC and NADB are unique institutions with fairly robust 
systems for funding infrastructure and water governance respectively; 
(4) in the last 75 years, nearly every dispute related to transbound-
ary water was resolved through cooperation;11 and (5) more work on 
transboundary water issues is needed related to supply, pollution, and 
usage, especially as it pertains to drought and climate change.12
Each organization has contributed to different elements of coop-
eration over shared water resources and pollution prevention in the 
border region. The IBWC has managed water allocation and water 
pollution, and the NADB has developed and "nanced infrastructure 
projects for local communities to address water pollution. Collectively, 
these activities have contributed to the prevention, mitigation, and res-
olution of water con!icts throughout the United States-Mexico border 
through cooperation13 and supported dispute prevention ahead of the 
need for resolution.
Primary Mexico-United States treaties for 
transboundary waters
A series of treaties between the United States and Mexico serve as the 
basis for cooperation over shared water resources in the border region. 
See Figure 3.3 for a timeline of these agreements.
The earliest treaty was signed shortly after the Mexican-American 
War: the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlements 
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Figure 3.3 Timeline of relevant treaties identi"ed by the authors.
between the US and Mexico.14 This agreement established the physical 
boundaries between the two countries and designates the Colorado 
and Rio Grande rivers to become international basins. The agreement 
was followed by "ve lesser, but still signi"cant conventions, through 
which the two countries cooperated on a range of issues: placement of 
boundary monuments; boundary disputes related to meandering riv-
ers; establishment of the International Boundary Commission (IBC); 
allocation of water in a segment of the Rio Grande; and construction 
of the commission’s "rst joint infrastructure project, the Rio Grande 
Recti"cation Project.
In 1944, the two countries entered a new treaty that continues to 
guide and in!uence water management and allocation decisions in the 
border region today. The Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of the Col-
orado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 Water Treaty) 
authorized the joint construction and operation of two dams along the 
lower basin of the Rio Grande, expansion of the IBC’s jurisdiction to 
include water and, thereby, creation of the IBWC, and distribution of 
the waters of the major cross border watersheds: the Colorado River, 
Tijuana River, and Rio Grande.15 It also tasked the IBWC by address-
ing border sanitation issues with a transboundary impact.
In the Colorado River, under Article 10 of the 1944 Water Treaty, 
the United States is required to ensure Mexico receives 1,850,234,000 
cubic meters of water annually. In the Rio Grande, the treaty recog-
nizes the bifurcation of the river as two separate basins and allocates 
only the waters of the lower basin amongst the two countries in speci"c 
terms. Under Article 1 of the 1906 Convention between the United 
States and Mexico “Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio 
Grande,” the United States is required to deliver 74,008,800 cubic me-
ters annually of water to Mexico from the upper basin. Article 4 of the 
1944 Water Treaty allocates to Mexico two-thirds and to the United 
States one-third of the waters of six Mexican tributaries (Conchos, 
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San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and Salado rivers, and the Las 
Vacas Arroyo), which collectively must amount to at least 431,721,000 
cubic meters per year averaged over a "ve-year cycle.16 The 1944 Wa-
ter Treaty also apportions to Mexico the entire !ow of two Mexican 
tributaries, the San Juan and Alamo rivers, while the United States 
is allotted the entire !ow of seven US tributaries: the Pecos and Dev-
il’s rivers, the Alamito, Terlingua, San Felipe, and Pinto creeks, and 
Goodenough Spring. The remaining waters in the lower Rio Grande 
basin are shared equally under the treaty.17
A distinctive element of the 1944 Water Treaty is the linkage em-
bedded into the agreement that includes the distribution of waters 
from two rivers in two geographically different regions along the bor-
der serving different basins. Itay Fischhendler et.al. argue that this 
arrangement has constrained the ability of the two nations to adapt 
management regimes in response to the unique environmental stresses 
of each river.18 Yet, Minutes 318, 319, and 323—which responded to 
reduced !ows in the Colorado and environmental degradation in the 
Colorado delta, and created a mechanism for Mexico to store its water 
allocations within the US—suggest such concerns can be addressed 
through the IBWC’s unique minute system for interpreting and imple-
menting the 1944 Water Treaty. Fischhendler et.al. also highlight that 
while Mexico receives water from, but does not contribute to, the Col-
orado River’s volume, the United States receives more water from the 
entire Rio Grande than it contributes to that river.19 To some extent, 
it appears that in developing the 1944 Water Treaty, the parties traded 
water from one watershed in exchange for water from another, an op-
tion that would not have been readily available had they negotiated 
separate agreements for each river.
While, on balance, this arrangement may appear fair to some and 
unfair to others, it was the product of more than 20 years of negotia-
tions involving issues beyond the mere allocation of water, including 
population pressures, sanitation, droughts and !oods, economic de-
velopment, and border security.20 Such pressures may have contrib-
uted to the two nations expanding the scope of the treaty to the three 
rivers in order to have more options for negotiating their respective 
priorities. Moreover, there may be an advantage to having only one 
institution with responsibility for all three rivers as the delivery and 
use of water across borders often involves multiple diverse stakehold-
ers with broadly different interests. If ever the treaty was opened for 
renegotiations, the consolidated approach could allow the two nations 
to fully consider all the diverse interests and priorities, as well as the 
implications for all of the encompassed river basins.21
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More recently, the United States and Mexico entered into two ad-
ditional agreements that expanded their transboundary interests 
beyond water, but have proven to be critically important for water 
management because of the actors brought into the conversation. On 
14 August 1983, the United States and Mexico signed the Agreement 
on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environ-
ment in the Border Area (La Paz Agreement), which serves as the basis 
for bilateral cooperation on environmental protection in the border 
zone, de"ned as 100 km north and south of the international line.22 
The agreement stipulates obligations related to consultation, infor-
mation sharing, review of environmental concerns, annual meetings, 
and formal reporting.23 It also designates the respective federal en-
vironmental agencies as the coordinators, thereby tasking the EPA 
and Mexico’s Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SE-
MARNAT) with protecting human health and the environment and 
obligating them to monitor and measure pollution levels related to 
water and air. Moreover, it obligates them to consult with state and 
municipal governments, nongovernmental organizations, and others 
on cooperative measures.24
Initially, the La Paz Agreement was used as a diplomatic instrument 
between the two governments through its respective environmental 
agencies to establish goals and objectives primarily related to water, 
air, and land issues. More recently, it has become a mechanism to pro-
vide joint funding. Binational initiatives include the Integrated Bor-
der Environmental Plan (1992–1994), Border XXI (1995–2000), Border 
2012 (2001–2012), and Border 2020 (2013–2020).25 The latter’s goal of 
access to clean and safe water includes objectives on increasing house-
hold water and sewer connections for the communities along the bor-
der, assisting utilities to build capacity, watershed protection through 
reduction of surface water contaminants, and sharing of water quality 
data for transboundary watersheds by both federal governments.26 It 
also calls for additional investment in water resource management. 
Under the auspices of the La Paz Agreement, these programs serve 
as an institutional framework for cooperation between the two gov-
ernments, raise awareness of environmental issues along the border, 
and provide a certain level of legitimacy that further strengthens en-
gagement among the various government agencies, most notably the 
IBWC, which has authority over transboundary water issues.27
Development of the goals and objectives of the La Paz Agreement 
is based on stakeholder engagement and a system of "ve taskforces 
geographically distributed along the border.28 Taskforce members in-
clude representatives from state and local governments, tribal groups, 
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academia, and nongovernmental organizations. This grassroots ap-
proach, managed binationally by EPA and SEMARNAT, follows a 
process of engagement through conferences with experts on water, air, 
and land issues, a yearly national conference, and various public com-
ment opportunities. To some extent, this participatory approach has 
provided legitimacy to the goals and objectives set under the frame-
work of the La Paz Agreement with each successive program building 
on the previous one.
During the early 1990s when NAFTA was being negotiated, envi-
ronmentalists expressed their growing dissatisfaction with the results 
of the La Paz Agreement.29 They had expected more attention and 
resources from the two federal governments and highlighted worsen-
ing environmental conditions in the border region where some of the 
poorest communities were located. During this time, many communi-
ties along the border did not have wastewater treatment, and pollution 
of transboundary rivers was an issue. Broadening support for NAFTA 
presented an opportunity to raise awareness of these conditions on 
the coattails of that agreement’s authorization process, and to link the 
border’s environmental health to trade.
As a result, the two countries were pressed by environmental stake-
holder groups to sign an agreement within the framework of the ne-
gotiations of NAFTA, known formally as the Agreement between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border 
Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American De-
velopment Bank (NADB Agreement).30 It created the NADB, which 
diverged in structure and process from the IBWC and included water 
pollution, wastewater treatment, and other priorities within its man-
date. Moreover, the NADB is truly a binational institution equally 
funded by both governments. Over the past 170 years, the implementa-
tion and evolution of these agreements along the United States-Mexico 
border have created a unique governance structure for cooperation.
The organizations
The IBWC, initially called the International Boundary Commission 
when it was created in 1889, changed to the current name under the 
1944 Water Treaty in recognition of its expanded jurisdiction, which 
now included the waters traversing the border. This broader authority 
authorized the IBWC to engage in binational solutions for issues that 
arose during the application of United States-Mexico treaties regard-
ing water-related boundary demarcation and rights to transboundary 
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waters, as well as issues related to sanitation, water quality, and !ood 
control in the frontier. The US Section has its principal of"ces in El 
Paso, Texas, while the Mexican Section operates across the border in 
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. Both sections also have seven "eld of"ces 
spread out along the border. Each section receives funding and policy 
guidance from its respective diplomacy agency, the US Department of 
State and Mexico’s Foreign Ministry.
All staff of the IBWC are federal employees of their respective coun-
try. The leadership team in each country includes a commissioner, 
who must be an engineer and is appointed directly by the president of 
the respective country, two principal engineers, a legal advisor, and a 
foreign affairs secretary.31 The management staff is composed primar-
ily of technically oriented professionals and is proud of its reputation 
as an engineering agency that gives policy guidance based on science. 
This unique element of management is the basis of the IBWC’s legiti-
macy, which has been called engineering diplomacy.32 While its orig-
inal priority focused on maintaining the international boundary, its 
authority has now grown to include water quantity and quality man-
agement, border sanitation, and emergency water supplies. Stephen 
Mumme suggests that
most important, the Commission has evolved as both a diplomatic 
and technical agency, with primary responsibilities for enforcing 
and interpreting the provisions of the international treaties with 
which it is entrusted, and anticipating and designing solutions to 
new problems within its jurisdiction.33
The IBWC collectively owns and operates major infrastructure includ-
ing !ood control levees and "ve diversion dams, as well as two ma-
jor reservoirs with power plant facilities located on the Rio Grande: 
Amistad and Falcon dams.34 This infrastructure is used to manage 
water delivery for both countries from the Rio Grande and Colorado 
River and is needed to address portions of the mandate associated 
with water quality monitoring, transboundary water deliveries, and 
!ood control. As part of its sanitation mandate, the IBWC also owns 
and operates three international wastewater treatment plants. These 
facilities were built to address untreated wastewater !ows primarily 
originating from Mexico and !owing into the United States. However, 
the Nogales facility also treats wastewater from both Nogales, Ari-
zona and Nogales, Sonora. Funding for the construction, operation, 
and maintenance of these facilities is provided by both countries. Over 
the last 30 years, no signi"cant infrastructure facilities have been built 
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in the border region, although the IBWC has rehabilitated a number 
of existing facilities.
The 1944 Water Treaty also allows the IBWC to document decisions 
involving the application of its mandate through minutes, binding 
instruments between the two governments.35 These are agreements 
covering a range of cross-border issues that mostly address demarca-
tion, operation, and maintenance of its infrastructure, water delivery 
related to drought and eco-systems, construction or rehabilitation of 
dams and other facilities, water quality issues such as salinity in water 
delivery, and water pollution and sanitation issues that cross the in-
ternational boundary, such as stormwater and untreated wastewater. 
Minutes are developed between the two IBWC sections and validated 
by the respective foreign affairs units.36 Once a minute is approved 
by both countries through the IBWC and con"rmed by the two gov-
ernments within a 30-day review period, minutes are considered part 
of the treaty. As of July 2019, 324 minutes have been issued by the 
IBWC.37
The IBWC focuses its efforts on engineering activities and solutions 
that may be proactive or reactive. Its actions are mostly technical, with 
limited stakeholder involvement and within the limits of its authority 
under the 1944 Water Treaty. Despite its long-standing operations, its 
location on the border and away from the capitals of the respective 
countries, some scholars have suggested that the IBWC is outmoded 
and needs to innovate, be less insular, and expand its public engage-
ment efforts.38 One has called the IBWC “a social artifact, imperfect at 
best, and captive to the vicissitudes of time.”39 Stakeholders have also 
expressed disappointment with the progress made on environmental 
issues. Some have claimed that the IBWC’s narrow focus on water re-
sources in the border region has led to the neglect of other critical con-
cerns, including air quality and land conservation. While it may have 
been logical to expand its mandate, they believe that the IBWC’s lack 
of agility to respond to emerging issues, its heavy focus on engineered 
solutions, and poor stakeholder engagement have not favored this 
path. As a result, some have argued that the La Paz Agreement, which 
created the NADB, was adopted because of the IBWC’s de"ciencies.40
The NADB itself was created in 1993 with a strict mandate related to 
the development and implementation of environmental infrastructure. 
It works in coordination with state and federal agencies by assisting 
local communities to improve environmental conditions and advance 
the well-being of residents in both nations. Although the organization 
does not own any infrastructure, its programs provide technical assis-
tance, grants, loans, and capacity building to utilities, municipalities, 
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academia, and the private sector for infrastructure development and 
implementation. The NADB’s leadership team consists of a chief ex-
ecutive of"cer and chief operating of"cer of opposite nationalities, ap-
pointed by each government and con"rmed by its Board of Directors 
(BOD). Unlike the IBWC, the NADB is an international organization 
with two contributing countries—the United States and Mexico. Its 
BOD consists of ten members, "ve from each country. Four are mem-
bers of the public at large and six come from federal agencies. Its em-
ployees are of both Mexican and US nationalities, co-located at its 
of"ces in San Antonio and Ciudad Juarez, and bene"t from certain 
diplomatic immunities.
The NADB is capitalized in equal parts by the US Treasury and 
Mexico’s Ministry of Finance. Its operations and programs are funded 
by the interest earned on its capital and funds from the US State De-
partment and SEMARNAT. It also receives program funds from the 
EPA, to disburse as grants to local communities along the border, un-
der the auspices of the Border 2012 and Border 2020 programs and the 
Border Infrastructure Fund (BIF). This has considerably improved 
water quality by eliminating the discharge of untreated sewage.
The NADB has been called the most consequential of the NAFTA- 
generated institutions because of its signi"cant impact on the bor-
der environment since its creation, especially as its actions relate to 
transboundary water pollution.41 This was possible precisely because 
the NADB was provided with important government backing from 
multiple federal agencies. Since 1993, funding provided to the NADB 
from the EPA, the US Treasury, Us State Department, and Mexico’s 
Finance and Environment ministries has exceeded $1 billion.42 The 
NADB has earned signi"cant legitimacy with stakeholders in border 
states and cities, as well as within academia. It also has implemented 
successful projects in just about every major community along the 
border. As of August 2017, its accomplishments included the funding 
of 147 water and wastewater projects for various utilities, bene"tting 
almost 13 million residents. The improvements in wastewater alone 
have a capacity to eliminate 462 million gallons per day of untreated 
or inadequately treated sewage.43
Prior to the NADB’s efforts, only 21 percent of Mexican residents 
along the border with the United States were connected to wastewa-
ter treatment facilities and typically discharged untreated sewage 
into shared waterbodies on the frontier. Today, nearly 90 percent of 
that population is connected to wastewater management facilities, 
signi"cantly reducing an important source of pollution.44 Similarly, 
on the US side, prior to 1993, there were over 400,000 residents in 
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unincorporated communities known as colonias in Texas and New 
Mexico that did not have wastewater treatment services and that dis-
charged their sewage into shared surface or groundwater bodies.45
Yet despite its successes in implementing infrastructure projects, the 
NADB also has its challenges. It implements individual projects in re-
sponse to requests submitted by municipalities.46 As a result, broader 
watershed issues are not addressed comprehensively and are simply 
cobbled together through individual local efforts. Currently, there is 
no strategy in place at the NADB to address water management holis-
tically, include groundwater, or consider issues related to drought or 
climate change.
Future challenges along the border
As is typical of most watersheds, especially those in arid climates, 
water is not always accessible in the quantity, quality, or location 
where it is needed. Over-allocation of available water resources, pro-
longed droughts, and pollution are common challenges. In the United 
States-Mexico border region, such challenges have sparked various 
disputes, most notably pertaining to three primary issues: delivery of 
water at speci"ed times and volumes, water quality de"ciencies mostly 
related to salinity and pollution, and conservation for the protection of 
the environment. To date, many of these disputes have been managed 
under the 1944 Water Treaty by the IBWC through the minute process, 
and for water pollution through the NADB funding programs. Two 
important con!icts have been resolved through IBWC cooperation: 
Mexico’s water debt to the United States in the Rio Grande for the 
accounting cycle of 1997–2002; and pulse !ow water deliveries in the 
lower portion of the Colorado River to begin restoration of the river’s 
delta ecosystem in Mexico, which has been designated as a United 
Nations Biosphere Reserve.47 Other more recent con!icts that have 
not been fully resolved include the lining of the All-American Canal in 
Arizona, which lowered groundwater levels across the border in Mex-
icali, and stormwater pollution !ows from Tijuana, Baja California 
into San Diego, California during precipitation events.
However, as droughts and climate change continue to impact the 
availability of water resources, and growing communities continue 
to affect water quality, the challenges facing the border region will 
need ongoing attention. In addition, the region faces new concerns 
related to untreated wastewater from collapsing sewer lines in cities 
adjacent to the international boundary, inadequately operated waste-
water treatment plants, and contaminated stormwater from growing 
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cities that primarily !ow from Mexico into the United States. Unfor-
tunately, neither country has given suf"cient attention to the environ-
mental impacts that these pollution concerns have had on estuaries, 
"sheries, and recreational areas.
The La Paz Agreement and NAFTA through the NADB Agreement 
have brought much attention to water issues along the border at the 
highest levels of government. Key agencies such as the EPA and SE-
MARNAT have also entered the water diplomacy arena previously 
dominated by the IBWC. This has introduced a different approach 
to decision-making and water-related project development given the 
EPA’s public transparency and regular engagement process, which is 
in sharp contrast to the IBWC’s insular history reinforced by the 1944 
Water Treaty’s omission of any required procedures for public par-
ticipation or review of operations.48 In addition, the public process 
associated with the La Paz Agreement and NADB Agreement has em-
powered local communities, states, nongovernmental organizations, 
and academia to demand more from the IBWC. This unwanted at-
tention from the public has further strengthened the negative percep-
tion of an IBWC that is slow to respond to challenges and criticism, 
interprets its scope very narrowly, and heavily focuses its efforts on 
engineered solutions.49
Although the NADB has also received the same pressures related 
to public engagement, unlike the IBWC it has speci"c requirements 
for engaging the public. These requirements were likely implemented 
because the organization was conceived as part of an environmental 
agenda and the EPA was directly involved in their creation. Further-
more, the EPA has provided the NADB with supplemental funds in 
the form of grants to address water and sanitation issues, which fur-
thered the latter’s achievements. Those funds were managed by the 
NADB and were used to leverage matching funds from Conagua and 
other state programs. These relationships and programs developed 
a diverse skill set within the NADB related to projects that include 
engineering, "nance, and environmental awareness, as well as public 
engagement.
The IBWC and NADB have two areas in which their activities 
overlap. The "rst relates to water pollution where both organizations 
worked on the issues. However, while the IBWC has not constructed 
any major infrastructure in at least 30 years, the NADB regularly 
continues to conduct ribbon-cutting ceremonies for newly funded 
infrastructure. Not surprisingly, these efforts have given the NADB 
a role in water diplomacy as well. The second area of overlap is the 
limited geographical region in which both organizations work, which 
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has facilitated a more localized approach. As compared to other fed-
eral or development agencies, whose locations are in Washington, 
DC and Mexico City, the IBWC and NADB’s leadership and staff 
live in or near border communities and are exposed to the region’s 
daily challenges. This provides local communities with quick, direct, 
and low-cost access to the institutions, and sensitizes staff to local 
needs.
Nonetheless, the differences between the IBWC and NADB are im-
portant. The IBWC functions as two separate but integrated federal 
agencies with independent sections representing their respective gov-
ernments. As an institution, the IBWC has had a long history of ac-
tivity, an established process of operations, a heavy engineering focus, 
no funding for community infrastructure, and a reputation for being 
isolated and limited in the interpretation of its own authority. The 
established purpose, process, and rules that created the agency have 
remained relatively consistent over its 130 years, and its mandate has 
been interpreted rather narrowly. As a result, the IBWC could "nd it 
dif"cult to adjust its operations in response to new challenges. Never-
theless, the organization has a strong and stable foundation grounded 
in long-standing treaties, full federal backing, and assets that it owns 
and operates.
In contrast, the NADB is an international organization with much 
less federal oversight, a shorter history, established public engagement 
processes, multi-skilled binational staff, and available funding for in-
frastructure. However, its limited mandate and project-speci"c focus 
constrains its ability to create policy level and holistic solutions related 
to water supply and quality.
Despite the IBWC’s stability and NADB’s !exibility, neither pro-
vides an ideal model of operation. For example, it is unclear whether 
either entity has the mandate to address the more than 30 aquifers 
that traverse the border. With the exception of pumping restrictions 
on the Yuma Aquifer under Minute 242, none of the aquifers have 
any management, allocation, or conservation mechanisms. Ironically, 
groundwater is a major regional concern because subsurface deple-
tion can affect surface !ows in adjacent rivers, pollution can nega-
tively impact groundwater quality, and drought can affect both rivers 
and groundwater. In a similar vein, neither the IBWC nor NADB have 
the capacity to develop the scienti"c analyses needed to ascertain how 
the border region will be affected by climate change. In general, coop-
eration remains unsystematic and ad hoc and lacks a broader vision 
for the management of the shared water resources between the two 
nations.50
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the existing river basin organization 
(RBO) framework is insuf"cient to address challenges in the basins 
and has overlaps and important gaps. Cooperation has been achieved 
through the minute process of the IBWC but has been limited to the 
narrow scope of the Colorado, Rio Grande, and Tijuana rivers. Other 
mechanisms used to address border water issues include various 
binational federal efforts, such as the La Paz Agreement and NADB 
Agreement. Both instruments have been used to remedy the gaps un-
addressed by the IBWC, most importantly providing a mechanism for 
public engagement on water management issues at the state and local 
levels. However, their success has been limited to the extent that they 
have only created a patchwork of local project agreements rather than 
a comprehensive mechanism.
To add to this patchwork, a binational groundwater assessment pro-
gram was initiated as a basis for information exchange through the 
US Geological Survey and Conagua.51 While coordinating with the 
IBWC, it is not clear if any single institution will serve as an RBO. 
The institutional requirements and legal regimes in each country are 
quite distinct and would require multi-level and multi-jurisdiction 
agreements to create such an RBO.
Natural resources are limited, and freshwater is diminishing in 
availability and quality along the United States-Mexico border. The 
vitality of communities along the border depends on these rivers and 
groundwater resources. Although the two countries have experienced 
challenges and disputes since their creation, over the past 170 years 
a treaty-based institutional framework for surface water has pro-
vided the governance mechanisms needed to promote cooperation 
over con!ict.52 Both the NADB and IBWC have been successful in 
applying their respective mandates because they were institutionally 
located along the border, their leadership was required to be techno-
crats rather than bureaucrats or diplomats, and they were structured 
to facilitate trust between the two countries. The IBWC has also been 
successful because of its singular structure as a binational federal 
agency with two sections, each responding to and advocating for its 
respective country. Moreover, each section was given authority to en-
ter into agreements through the very unique minute system by which 
the agreements are crafted on the border and then sent to the respec-
tive capitals for approval/rejection. In addition, the structure of the 
NADB as a single international organization with both Mexican and 
American nationals co-located and governed by a binational board 
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has engendered trust from states and local communities as a neutral 
party. Combined with its history of achievement and management of 
signi"cant funds, the NADB has gained considerable recognition and 
respect among the border states and local communities in a relatively 
short time.
Yet, more needs to be done for both surface and subsurface water 
resources, and the challenges that they face from drought and climate 
change. In particular, the lack of meaningful cooperation over the re-
gion’s shared aquifers with a clear authority eventually could become 
a source of dispute between the two countries. In addition, currently 
there is no strategy in place to address water management holistically 
or to consider issues related to drought or climate change.
At the moment, there seems to be little appetite to expand the 
purview of the IBWC or NADB and put one of these in charge of a 
strategy for comprehensive water management, much less with the 
authority to manage all water resources on the border. While expand-
ing the IBWC’s authority may seem like the most obvious solution, 
the NADB’s efforts in recent years have diverted attention and con-
siderable funding away from the IBWC. As a result, gaps in man-
agement and cooperation are likely to continue in the border region 
and for its residents, especially as water becomes scarcer and demand 
continues to grow.
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